Mathematical Physicalism

Imagine that, using a powerful computer, we discover a cellular automaton universe that generates patterns that appear to us, after much analysis, to be intelligent and conscious. (For instance, imagine that, after painstakingly learning the “language” that some of these patterns use for interpersonal communication, we find that they talk to each other about their conscious experiences, ask each other philosophical questions about the existence of their cellular universe, etc.) The commonsensical view is that this universe’s mathematical definition (which may fit on an 8.5×11 sheet of paper), and the infinite collection of mathematical facts that it generates, don’t by themselves give rise to conscious experiences. Mathematical patterns, in order to be conscious, must be implemented in some sense—either by one of our physical computers, or in some other physical sense.

As commonsensical as this view may seem, I find it deeply problematic. I propose that we abandon the idea that there’s some fundamental distinction between implemented and unimplemented computations or mathematical structures, and likewise abandon our standard, but incoherent, notions of “physical existence” and “contingent truth”. I contend that mathematical facts themselves play the role that our notion of “physical existence” is supposed to play in our account of how things work, and that nothing extra is required, or even conceivable. This general idea is known as the mathematical universe hypothesis, and I call my version of it mathematical physicalism.

I’m not simply suggesting that all mathematical structures do, in fact, exist physically. In that case, I would still wonder why all mathematical structures exist, rather than just some of them, or exactly one of them. And I’d still have to explain what this mysterious property of “physical existence” is.

Instead, I contend that, in a sense, there’s no such thing as “physical existence”. Mathematical facts themselves play the role that “physical existence” is supposed to play in our account of how things work. Therefore, all mathematical structures “exist” by definition. To put it more carefully, the concept of “existence” as something extra that needs to be added to mathematical structures in order to make them “real” is a philosophical fiction—a conceptual confusion.

It follows that any mathematical pattern that we claim “would be” conscious, if only we added this mysterious property of “physical existence” to it, is in fact already conscious as an analytic fact. The idea that a mathematical pattern can have all of the requisite features of a conscious being and yet not be conscious is as absurd as the idea of a philosophical zombie—an object that’s identical to you in every physical detail and yet is not conscious.

I’ll return to this zombie analogy many times in this blog. I don’t believe that physical patterns require some mysterious extra property of Consciousness in order to be conscious. Physical patterns that behave in the requisite ways simply are conscious, as an analytic fact. That’s all that “being conscious” means. Similarly I don’t believe that mathematical structures require some mysterious extra property of Physical Existence or Implementation in order to be “real”. Mathematical structures simply are real, as a matter of analytic fact. That’s all that “being real” means. And by extension, mathematical patterns within these structures that exhibit the requisite “behavior” simply are conscious, because the math-stuff that they’re made of is as real as anything gets. The concept of Physical Existence as a magical something-or-other that gets added to mathematical structures belongs in the dustbin of history along with the idea of Consciousness (with a capitol ‘C’), Free Will (with a capitol ‘FW’), the Immaterial Soul, and the Élan Vital of the vitalists.

It should be clear that if mathematical physicalism is true, it resolves the problem of physical existence. Mathematical truths are necessary truths, and if “physical existence” is nothing more than a collection of these truths, there’s no longer a question of why something exists rather than nothing. The question of “why does this something exist rather than some other something?” is also resolved: all mathematical universes “exist”, and this is just the one we happen to find ourselves in. We may wonder why the one we find ourselves in is so law-like, but that’s a different question (and a topic for future blog posts). Mathematical physicalism has the benefit of replacing an intractable pseudo-problem with a coherent and potentially tractable one.

None of this counts as an adequate defense of mathematical physicalism, although I’ve hinted at some of the reasons I suspect it’s correct. In future posts I’ll offer more detailed arguments in its favor, answer objections, and explore some of its consequences.

2 thoughts on “Mathematical Physicalism”

  1. It’s a pleasure to follow the crystal-clear presentation of your thoughts, Kory!

    I conducted similar thought experiments many years ago, like running a simulation hosting conscious beings at different speeds on a computer. Of course, my “inhabitants” didn’t notice any difference, as “their time” proceeded by its own (mathematical) logic, independently from the CPU cycles of my computer. I realized that the computer acted only as a “remote” observation device, like a microscope or telescope in our “local” physics.

    Then my hypothetical computer would crash every once in a while, and I would have to reload the simulation from a previous backup. Again, I enjoyed the insight that for those living inside the simulation, nothing special had happened, and that the temporal discontinuity in “my execution” of “their universe” was totally transparent to them.

    Finally, I imagined that I stop the simulation and archive everything to continue at a later time. Then our whole civilization disappears, but archeologists in a distant future discover my simulation and take over from the point I have gotten to. Even in such a bizarre scenario, the simulated population would always experience a smooth flow of time, regardless how many centuries the simulation has been buried in between! And even if nobody had ever dug it out again, “they” wouldn’t have noticed either, but would (in their mathematical reality) continue whatever they were doing when I shut down the simulation.

    It’s late at night here in Austria, but I’ll write again to share my thoughts whether OUR reality could be of that kind…

    1. Hi Herwig, thanks for your comments. Of course, the idea that the simulated population will continue to have experiences even when the simulation is discontinued is the contentious one. I’ll try to build a case for it as I proceed.

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